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Comments
Capital Juries and the
Fair Cross-Section Requirement:
Modern Constitutional Reasoning
in Jury Selection
INTRODUCTION
On October 29, 1984, the Supreme Court of the United States
denied certiorari to Karu Gene White,' convicted of three counts
of murder and sentenced to die as a result of a botched robbery
in rural Breathitt County, Kentucky. 2 This Comment proposes
to demonstrate that the affirmance of White's conviction and
sentence perpetuates a fundamental-and unconstitutional-de-
fect in the procedure employed in jury selection for capital
murder trials. As will be demonstrated, because of the exclusion
of potential jurors who adamantly oppose the death penalty,
capital murder defendants in Kentucky and throughout the coun-
try are denied their constitutional right to a jury drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community.3
I White v. Kentucky, 105 S. Ct. 363 (1984).
See White v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Ky. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 363 (1984).
Prof. Walter E. Oberer traced the origin of this exclusionary practice to a time
when conviction of certain offenses made capital punishment automatic: "Since the sole
function of the jury was the determination of guilt-the penalty flowing from an
affirmative finding as a matter of law-it was deemed of vital consequence that the
jurors be qualified on the death penalty." Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for
Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?,
39 TEx. L. REv. 545, 550 (1961).
This author contends that, since this procedure is no longer used in Kentucky or
many other states, violations of the fair cross-section requirement are more easily cured.
For other state practices regarding exclusion of prospective jurors adamantly opposed
to the death penalty, see Annot., 39 A.L.R.3D 550 (1971).
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Although the primary contention in Witherspoon v. Illinois
was that exclusion of all such conscientious objectors to the
death penalty creates a jury prone to conviction, 5 "[t]he consti-
tutional question is whether the jury must be 'impartially drawn
from a cross-section of the community,' or whether it can be
drawn with systematic and intentional exclusion of some quali-
fied groups." ' 6 The "qualified group" that is excluded in viola-
tion of the fair cross-section requirement is the subset of death
penalty objectors who could render an impartial decision as to
guilt or innocence.
7
1 391 U.S. 510 (1968). In Witherspoon, the Court held that there was not sufficient
evidence to support Witherspoon's contention, nor could the Court take judicial notice
"that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative
jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction." Id. at 518.
See also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). In Bumper, the defendant
argued that a jury which excluded all those opposed to capital punishment as well as
those who had conscientious scruples against the death penalty resulted in a jury biased
as to the defendant's guilt. The Court again held that there was insufficient evidence to
support such a claim. See id. at 545.
1 See 391 U.S. at 516.
6 Id. at 524 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
296 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting)). In Fay, the Court reviewed the use of New York's
"blue ribbon" jury panel, a panel picked by jury commissioners after personal inter-
views. The Court upheld the system, although the record established that of 2,911 names
on the panel, only 30 were women. See 332 U.S. at 273 n.14.
7 The range of attitudes held by prospective jurors may be represented by the
following table, taken from Berry, Death Qualification and the "Fireside Induction," 5
U. ARK. LiTrLE ROCK L.J. 1, 2 (1982).
Attitude Toward Death Penalty
'Automatic 2Favor death 3Indifferent 'Oppose sAutomatic life impris-
death penalty penalty group. death penalty onment group.
group. group. group.
Will always Favors death Neither fa- Opposes or Will always vote for life
vote for death penalty but vors nor op- has doubts imprisonment instead of
penalty in- will not vote poses death about penalty death penalty
stead of life to impose it penalty, but will not A) those who could not
imprison- in every case. vote against be impartial as to guilt
ment. it in every or innocence, due to the
case. possibility of the death
penalty;
B) those who could be
impartial as to guilt or
innocence.
Group 5 will be known as the "Witherspoon excludables," those removed from
juries because of their opposition to the death penalty. 5(B) may be further classified as
"guilt phase includables." This subset is at the heart of this controversy. Because they
profess an ability to be impartial at the guilt/innocence phase of a trial, the author
contends they are "qualified" and cannot constitutionally be excluded from jury service.
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Attempting to answer the constitutional question posed above
in regard to this "impartial objector" group, this Comment
addresses: (I) the historical development of this fair cross-section
requirement from an equal protection issue to a sixth amendment
concept; (II) the burden imposed upon a defendant in an attempt
to establish a prima facie violation of this right to a represent-
ative jury; (III) the recent litigation involving allegations of
underrepresentation of the groups presently excluded from jury
service; and finally (IV) the reaction of the Kentucky Supreme
Court to this recent constitutional reasoning.
I. HISTOICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FAIR CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT
A. The Foundational Support of the Fourteenth Amendment
8
The genesis of the challenge to a jury from which conscien-
tious objectors to the death penalty have been excluded lies in
other constitutional theories9 and not in the sixth amendment's
fair cross-section requirement as currently argued.' 0 When Strau-
der v. West Virginia" was decided more than a century ago, the
United States Supreme Court relied upon the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to reverse the conviction of
a black man tried and convicted of murder by an all-white jury.'
2
a No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See generally, J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 13-16 (1977) (excellent
discussion of early cross-section development); Note, The Fair Cross-Section Require-
ment: Defendant's Friend or Foe?, 4 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 317 (1981-82) (discussion
of the limitations imposed upon sixth amendment impartial jury requirement by four-
teenth amendment analysis).
,0 U.S. CONST. amend. VI reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
" 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
,2 See id. at 310, 312.
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Exclusion of blacks from jury service obviated the amend-
ment's purpose of "securing to a race recently emancipated...
all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy[s] .' ' 3 More than
half a century later,14 in an attempt to extend fourteenth amend-
ment protection,'5 the Court held in Smith v. Texas16 that exclu-
sion of blacks from juries violated equal protection by preventing
juries from being "truly representative of the community.'
' 7
The Court propagated this understated principle one year
later in Glasser v. United States.' In Glasser, the defendant
alleged that his right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section
of the community was violated by the practice of adding women
to jury rolls solely from lists furnished by the Illinois League of
Women Voters. 19 The Court denied Glasser relief on the ground
" Id. at 306.
14 During this lapse of time, the Supreme Court usually relied upon procedural
barriers in denying relief to those challenging jury selection. See Gibson v. Mississippi,
162 U.S. 565 (1896); In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313
(1879). See also Ziegler, Young Adults as a Cognizable Group in Jury Selection, 76
MICH. L. REv. 1045, 1050 n.30 (1977-78).
'" Generally narrowing the protections of the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause, The Strauder Court stated:
We do not say that within the limits from which it is not excluded
by the amendment a State may not prescribe the qualifications of its jurors,
and in so doing make discriminations. It may confine the selection to
males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to
persons having educational qualifications. We do not believe the Fourteenth
Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this.
100 U.S. at 310.
6 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
" Id. at 130.
's 315 U.S. 60 (1941).
19 The defendant alleged that the women on the lists had attended pro-prosecution
classes and lectures and that as a result he did not have "a trial by a jury free from
bias, prejudice, and prior instructions." Id. at 84.
The Court indirectly observed the interconnection between the cross-section issue
and the impartiality issue. See generally Oberer, supra note 3 (a discussion of the fair
cross-section requirement's effect on the impartial jury). The Court reasoned: "No
matter how high-principled and imbued with a desire to inculcate public virtue such
organizations may be, the dangers inherent in such a method of selection are the more
real when the members of those organizations, from training or otherwise, acquire a
bias in favor of the prosecution." 315 U.S. at 86.
The Court recognized that by selecting women for jury service solely from that
list of allegedly biased women supplied by the Illinois League of Women Voters, a
segment of the "community"--or a subset of all women voters-would be excluded,
the result being an unrepresentative jury. A logical analogy can be made between that
type of exclusion and the kind resulting from the Witherspoon standard. The resulting
jury under Witherspoon is a select group of jurors taken from the State's list which
includes only those potential jurors unopposed to the death penalty. Obviously, a segment
of society is unrepresented, and the jury, one of the State's "organizations," may be
biased in favor of the prosecution.
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that he had not proved his allegations. 20 Mr. Justice Murphy, 2'
however, speaking for the majority, opined that "the officials
charged with choosing federal jurors may exercise some discre-
tion to the end that competent jurors may be called. But they
must not allow the desire for competent jurors to lead them into
selections which do not comport with the concept of the jury as
a cross-section of the community.'' 2
B. The Classification of the Fair Cross-Section Requirement as
a Sixth Amendment Concept
Language regarding the "representativeness" of the jury was
consistently used in cases challenging jury composition, regard-
less of the underlying rationale of the Supreme Court's review
and decision. For example, Glasser v. United States was reviewed
under the Court's supervisory power over federal courts. 23 The
Court, however, did not expressly recognize the actual origin of
this concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community
until the 1975 decision of Taylor v. Louisiana.24 Taylor, con-
10 See 315 U.S. at 87. Glasser had filed only an affidavit making general allega-
tions. The Court specifically stated that it would have ordered a new trial had he proved
the allegations. See id. The Court's discourse on the issue, however, was surprisingly in-
depth in light of its evasion of such topics in the past. See note 14 supra.
21 Mr. Justice Murphy had become one of the Court's leaders in advancing the
fair cross-section requirement. See Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury-Selection Pro-
cedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1975-76). His death in
1949, combined with the death of his supporter, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in the same year,
may be one reason for the Court's subsequent evasion of the topic. Id. at 27 n.106.
21 315 U.S. at 86.
2 See id. at 83-86. Cf. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (Court
exercised its power of supervision over the administration of justice in the federal courts
and held that the purposeful and systemic exclusion of women from the jury panel
constituted reversible error.); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946)
(Court exercised its power of supervision over the administration of justice in the federal
courts and struck down the method by which the jury.panel was formed.).
Lower courts have heard challenges brought on due process grounds. See generally
United States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d 307, 313 (9th Cir. 1973), affd, 418 U.S. 87 (1974);
United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 142 (S.D.N.Y., 1972), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1245
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973); United States v. Deardorff, 343 F.
Supp. 1033, 1043 (S.D.N.Y., 1971); United States v. Gargan, 314 F. Supp. 414, 416
(W.D. Wis. 1970), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972). For a discussion of this due process argument emanating
from the fifth and fourteenth amendments, see Note, supra note 9, at 323.
-4 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Before this decision, the Court had evaded the cross-section
issue since the 1940s, much in the same way it had done after the turn of the century.
See note 14 supra. For a discussion of the possible theories underlying the Court's
inactivity, see Daughtrey, supra note 21, at 27 n.107.
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victed of aggravated kidnapping,2 challenged a Louisiana statute
providing that a woman could not be selected for jury service
until she had filed a written declaration of her willingness to
serve as a juror.26 The Court fully embraced the fair cross-
section requirement as an element of the sixth amendment, 27
thereby imposing this principle on state trials.2 8 Sustaining Tay-
lor's challenge, 29 the Court noted: "The unmistakable import of
this Court's opinions, at least since 1940,... and not repudiated
by intervening decisions, is that the selection of a petit jury from
a representative cross-section of the community is an essential
component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial."30
By finally classifying this right as a sixth amendment concept,
the Supreme Court, in effect, magnified the protection the
amendment affords. As a sixth amendment guarantee, "[t]he
right to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely rational
grounds."'" Before the state must defend its jury selection pro-
cedure and the propriety of the resulting jury, however, the
defendant must establish a violation of the right to a represent-
ative jury.32
II. THE PRIMA FACiE TEST OF Duren v. Missouri
In Duren v. Missouri,33 the United States Supreme Court
held that to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-
section requirement, the defendant must show
1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive"
group in the community; 2) that the representation of this
See 419 U.S. at 524.
1 "A woman shall not be selected for jury service unless she has previously filed
with the clerk of court of such parrish [sic] in which she resides a written declaration
of her desire to be subject to jury service." L.A. CODE CIUM. PROC. art. 402 (West 1967)
(repealed 1975).
27 See 419 U.S. at 530.
The Supreme Court had already established that the sixth amendment was
binding upon the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
19 See 419 U.S. at 537. "We are also persuaded that the fair-cross-section require-
ment is violated by the systematic exclusion of women, who in the judicial district
involved have amounted to 53% of the citizens eligible for jury service." Id. at 531.
30 419 U.S. at 528.
1' Id. at 534. But see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (statute similar to
Louisiana statute in Taylor upheld).
32 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
33 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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group in venires[34] from which juries are selected is not fair
and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in
the community; and 3) that this underrepresentation is due to
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.
3 5
Though this test supposedly applies to all challenges of jury
representativeness, 3 6 a defendant challenging a death-qualified
jury assumes a greater burden than other defendants in relation
to the first and second prongs of the Duren test. As a result of
the apparent lack of identifiable traits, beliefs or immutable
characteristics common to those opposing the death penalty,
3 7
defendants must employ empirical data to show that the group
is "a distinctive group in the community.
' 38
Assuming a defendant establishes that the excluded group is
"distinctive," it must be shown that the representativeness of
the group "in venires from which juries are selected is not fair
and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community." 3 9 Literally, this prohibits a successful challenge to
a jury composed under Witherspoon standards, because the ex-
clusion is obtained during voir dire, after the venire has already
been chosen.40
Ironically, this procedure for excluding prospective jurors
during voir dire automatically fulfills the requirement that the
underrepresentation be a result of "systematic exclusion" of the
1' Venire is defined as "[t]he list of jurors summoned to serve as jurors for a
particular term." BLACK'S LAW DIcTioNARY 1395 (5th ed. 1979).
" 439 U.S. at 364.
The process challenged in Duren allowed any woman to receive, upon request,
automatic exemption from jury service. Id. at 361.
-See notes 69-71 infra.
1' While statistics are important in all defendants' challenges to jury composition,
the Duren test practically demands such measures to show that the representation of the
excluded group is not reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community.
In some circumstances, statistical data must be used to establish that the group is
"distinctive," in accordance with the first prong of the Duren test. Such is the case with
"Witherspoon excIudables." See text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
11 439 U.S. at 364.
- This distinction is a result of the Witherspoon decision that jurors opposed to
the death penalty may be challenged for cause during voir dire. Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968). For a discussion of the use of preemptory challenges and
the constitutional implications in this context, see Winick, Prosecutorial Preemptory
Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1982-83).
11151984-1985]
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group. However, to contend that the Supreme Court purpose-
fully intended to restrict the range of jury selection challenges
to venires only is to ignore the ultimate objective advanced by
composing juries representative of the community. That argu-
ment "flies in the face of the policies underlying the cross-
section requirement and, if accepted, would provide a device for
avoiding the effect thereof."'4 1 Moreover, the Supreme Court in
Ballew v. Georgia42 circumvented its own language and applied
the representative standards directly to the jury as empaneled.
In Ballew, the Court sustained a challenge to the use of five
person juries in misdemeanor cases, reasoning that the size "pre-
vents juries from truly representing their communities." 4 3 That
language tends to support the theory that the Court did not
intend for Duren to be limited to venires.44
4 Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1285 (E.D. Ark. 1983). The Grigsby
court made the statement in response to the respondent's suggestion that the cross-
section requirement applied only to "venires and not to actual juries." Id. See also
Winick, supra note 40, at 62 (discussing the underlying theories of the fair cross-section
requirement).
.2 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
'3 Id. at 239.
But see Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 671 F.2d
858 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982). In Smith, a convicted murderer contended
that death penalty-opposed jurors comprise a distinctive group whose systematic exclu-
sion infringes upon the sixth amendment right to a jury representing a fair cross-section
of the community.
The court of appeals stated that any data offered as evidence as to the distinctive-
ness of the group would be irrelevant because Duren was decided in regard to venires,
not juries. Id. at 583 n.26. This illogical dicta may be explained by the court's general
misunderstanding regarding the rationale of the fair cross-section requirement. In dis-
posing of Smith's challenge, the court reasoned that any time a group is legitimately
disqualified from jury service, the attempt to compose a jury representative of the
community is impeded:
One would not suppose, for example, that defendant Jones who was
on trial for murder in Jones County, 85% of which is populated by
members of the Jones family, is entitled to a jury on which members of
the Jones family serve, even though a jury from which Jones family
members are excluded would not reflect a fair cross-section of the com-
munity.
Id. at 582.
The court failed to recognize that the Jones family members would be disqualified
from jury service because of their relationship to the defendant. The group excluded
under Witherspoon exhibits no such obvious relationship. The group is, in fact, qualified
because its members are capable of rendering an impartial decision as to a defendant's
guilt regardless of death penalty attitudes.
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III. RECENT LITIGATION OF THE CROSS-SECTION
REQUIREMENT: EVIDENCE ERODES Witherspoon
Circumstances have changed drastically since the Supreme
Court ruled that petitioner Witherspoon's data was "too tenta-
tive and fragmentary' 4 to hold, as Justice Douglas4 6 concluded,
that exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment "results
in a systematic exclusion of qualified groups, and the deprivation
to the accused of a cross-section of the commmunity for decision
on both his guilt and his punishment." 47 Grigsby v. Mabry
48
provides a comprehensive analysis of the post-Witherspoon data
concerning the exclusion of those opposed to the death penalty.
In Grigsby, three petitioners convicted of capital murder argued
that juries qualified under Witherspoon standards were neither
representative of the community nor impartial as to the issue of
guilt or innocence. 9
The petitioner based his challenge on a tremendous amount
of empirical data, 50 and expert testimony designed to establish
See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 517.
" Justice Douglas had dissented with Justices Black, Rutledge and Murphy in Fay
v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 296 (1947). For a brief discussion of Fay see note 6 supra.
4' 391 U.S. at 528.
41 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983). The history of the Grigsby case is interesting
because of the indecision and ambiguity with which this issue is viewed. Four days
before the state court trial, defense counsel for Grigsby filed a motion for a ruling that
potential jurors opposed to the death penalty not be challenged for cause during the
guilt-innocence phase of the trial. Grigsby v. Mabry, 483 F. Supp. 1372, 1375-76 (E.D.
Ark. 1980). That motion was denied and Grigsby was convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Id. at 1376. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed. Id. Having
exhausted his state remedies, Grigsby appealed to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas. Chief Judge Eisle ruled that Grigsby had established
a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement but denied him relief on the
grounds that Witherspoon had not been overruled and that the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals would probably uphold Witherspoon. See id. at 1384-85. Chief Judge Eisle did
order that an evidentiary hearing be conducted by the Franklin County Circuit Court
regarding Grigsby's allegation that he had been denied an impartial jury. See id. at
1391.
On appeal by the state, the court of appeals affirmed, but directed that the
evidentiary hearing be held in Chief Judge Eisle's court. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 637
F.2d 525, 529 (8th Cir. 1980). Whether or not this was implicit approval to Chief Judge
Eisle's dicta in the first decision remains uncertain.
49 See 569 F. Supp. at 1277.
See id. at 1288-1305. Analysis of such empirical evidence is necessary when
examining the exclusion of a group of prospective jurors apparently united only by their
opposition to the death penalty. When examining the exclusion of a group such as
blacks, on the other hand, an analytical approach is not necessarily required to establish
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the excluded group as "distinctive." As concluded in Grigsby,
the available data proves overwhelmingly5' that the group ex-
cluded from juries in death penalty cases is a distinctive group,
its members sharing many attitudes and ideals. 2
The evidence established, among other things, that a direct
relationship exists between a prospective juror's attitudes con-
cerning the death penalty and his opinions on other critical legal
principles. For example, one who "strongly favors" or "favors"
or is merely "opposed" to the death penalty differs attitudinally
from one who "strongly opposed '5 3 the death penalty by being
more likely (a) to disregard the presumption of innocence, (b)
to criticize the exercise of one's fifth amendment right to remain
silent, (c) to believe that courts are too concerned with protecting
the rights of criminals and (d) to believe that the insanity defense
is a loophole.14
The dispositive data in Grigsby, however, concerned the
exclusion of blacks and women which results from excluding
those potential jurors who are opposed to the death penalty. 5
The evidence established, for example, that only 5.8 percent of
blacks strongly favor the death penalty while 30.4 percent are
opposed, as compared to 20.4 percent of whites who are strongly
in favor of capital punishment while 9.9 percent are opposed.
5 6
the group's distinctiveness. The removal of a racial group from juries results in the
exclusion for no good cause of an obviously distinctive segment of society. Whether or
not blacks share distinct attitudes is theoretically irrelevant. See id. at 1279. When a
group such as the "Witherspoon excludables" is under scrutiny, however, it is the
defendant's burden to show that there are distinctive attitudes within the group that
would be unrepresented on the jury if the group is excluded.
1, "The evidence introduced here makes it abundantly clear that juries death-
qualified under Witherspoon standards are not as representative of the community as
they could, and should, be.. . ." Id. at 1321.
52 Id. at 1293. See, e.g., Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representa-
tiveness of the Death Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42
COLO. L. RE. 1, 7-15 (1970-71).
11 See note 7 supra.
14 569 F. Supp. at 1293.
11 Blacks and women constitute significant and distinctive groups of jury-eligible
citizens within Arkansas and the Nation. Death qualification results in their
systematic disproportionate removal from juries which try the guilt-inno-
cence of persons accused of capital crimes, without adequate justification,
in violation of the accused's right to a representative jury comprised of a
fair cross-section of the community.
569 F. Supp. at 1294.
56 Id. See also Bronson, supra note 52, at 7-26; Goldberg, Toward Expansion of
Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and the Use of Psychological Data to Raise
Presumptions in the Law, 5 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 53, 59-66 (1970); Jurow, New
Data on the Effects of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination Process,
84 HARv. L. Rav. 567, 576-98 (1970-71).
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Convinced that the excluded jurors comprised a distinctive
group, the Grigsby court examined the state's justification for
the unconstitutional violation.5 7 Though recognizing legitimate
state interests 5 8 the court held that no such interests may justify
constitutional violations when a defendant's life is at stake.
5 9
A federal district court in North Carolina reached a similar
conclusion regarding the fair cross-section requirement in capital
cases in Keeten v. Garrison.60 Relying on some of the same
evidence compiled in Grigsby, ' the court concluded that the
systematic and deliberate exclusion from the guilt phase of trials
of those opposed to the death penalty yet capable of an im-
partial verdict as to guilt or innocence violates a defendant's
right to a representative jury.6 2
The California Supreme Court rejected this challenge to
death-qualified juries after examining the evidence in People v.
Fields.63 The defendant Fields contended that the exclusion of
" See 569 F. Supp. at 1313. See also notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text
(discussion of the two other prongs in the prima facie test of Duren).
:1 See 569 F. Supp. at 1319. The court accepted that the state does have the right
to death-qualified jurors who will participate in the penalty phase of a trial, thereby
upholding the state's interest in obtaining a capital sentence in appropriate cases. Id.
The court also recognized the state's right to exclude at the guilt determination phase
of capital trials those prospective jurors who could not make an impartial decision as
to guilt or innocence due to their opposition to the death penalty. Id.
11 The court rejected the state's argument that impaneling two juries, one for the
guilt phase and one for the sentencing phase, would create an undue burden on the
state:
Procedures could be developed so that the penalty-phase jury could
be impaneled promptly after the conclusion of the guilt-determination trial
so that witnesses would not become unavailable or other evidence lost. All
of the actors in the drama would be the same except the jurors, so no
significant additional preparation time would be required.
Id. at 1320.
10 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C. 1984), order rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984).
61 Compare 569 F. Supp. at 1294-1309, with 578 F. Supp. at 1171-77.
' See 578 F. Supp. at 1167.
6 673 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 267 (1984). California courts
have long held that exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty does not deny
defendants a fair and impartial jury. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301 (Cal.
1980). In Hovey, the California court reviewed numerous studies, and concluded that
since both ends of the spectrum could be removed for cause-both those who would
automatically impose the death penalty and those who would never impose the death
penalty-the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant did not have a
nonneutral jury. Id. at 1346. See also People v. Gonzales, 426 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1967);
People v. Thomas, 423 P.2d 233 (Cal. 1967) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 868 (1967); People
v. Smith, 409 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1966) cert. denied, 388 U.S. 913 (1967). The court had,
1120 KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL [Vol. 73
persons who admit during voir dire that they would automati-
cally vote against the death penalty results in a jury unrepresen-
tative of the community. 64
The court concluded, however, that the excluded group, "a
class divided in all else, including even their reasons for refusing
to consider the death penalty-is not a cognizable class. '"65 The
majority reasoned that the group cannot be classified as distinc-
tive because, in general, the members shared no common back-
ground and experience giving rise to the distinctive attitudes
defining the group.
66
The California court's theoretical rather than practical anal-
ysis of the exclusion seems unjustified.67 After all, the effects
however, avoided the cross-section issue when raised by capital defendants. The court
decided to resolve the issue in Fields, noting that since Duren had been set forth "[n]o
decision of this court, and no controlling precedent from the Supreme Court, has
addressed the exclusion of 'guilt phase includables' jurors under this analytical struc-
ture." 673 P.2d at 689. See also Rector v. State, 659 S.W.2d 168 (Ark. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2370 (1984). The extent to which the Rector court reviewed the
available evidence is exhibited by the following quote:
We may ask, why should the most cowardly and contemptible of
criminals, merely by reason of the viciousness of their crimes, be favored
in jury selection to a greater degree than any other accused person or any
litigant in a civil case? The studies opposing death-qualified juries present
no answer to that inquiry.
Id. at 173.
61 673 P.2d at 683. While the seriousness of Field's alleged crimes probably did
not affect the court's decision, a case of less egregious offenses may have been more
appropriate for the disposition of this issue. Even though Fields had only been out of
prison for three weeks, he was eventually convicted of the following offenses: "The
robbery murder of Rosemary C .... ; the robbery of Clarence G.; the kidnapping for
robbery and forced oral copulation of Cynthia S.; the kidnapping for robbery and
robbery of Gwendolyn B., as well as rape, forcible oral copulation, and assault with a
deadly weapon on Gwendolyn; the kidnapping, robbery, forcible oral copulation, and
rape of Colleen C." Id. at 683. The case against Fields was considerably bolstered when
his mother appeared at the preliminary hearing wearing Colleen C.'s blouse. See id. at
686.
" Id. at 692.
m See id. at 691-92. The court relied partially on standards set forth in Rubio v.
Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1979). Rubio, a case involving the exclusion of
felons and ex-felons from juries, premised its test for distinctive groups on whether or
not there were shared attitudes among the members of the group due to a common
background or life experience: "It is not enough to find a characteristic possessed by
some persons in the community but not by others; the characteristic must also impart
to its possessors a common social or psychological outlook on human events." Id. at
598. The Rubio court also required the defendant to show that the perspective of the
excluded group could not be adequately represented by other members of the jury. See
id. at 599.
-, Under this view, an organization such as the League of Women Voters probably
could not constitute a distinctive group.
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attitudes may have at the time of trial is the critical issue in
examining jury composition. Prospective jurors questioned dur-
ing voir dire are asked whether or not their opinions of the
death penalty will affect their capability to perform as required
by law, not why or whether their backgrounds are comparable
to those sharing similar opinions.68
Furthermore, if the Supreme Court of California requires a
common background giving rise to the distinctive attitudes shared
by the group excluded from juries, the evidence addressed in
Grigsby and Keeten should fulfill that requirement .6 9 As Chief
Justice Bird noted in a dissenting opinion in Fields, the majority
must have "simply ignored"70 those studies, especially those
establishing that " 'guilt phase includables' tend to differ from
the rest of the jury pool in many matters in addition to their
unwillingness to vote for a death sentence.'"
7 '
IV. KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT REACTION
TO THE PROSCRIPTION OF Witherspoon
As it did in White v. Commonwealth,72 the Kentucky Su-
preme Court has "simply ignored" the cross-section issue raised
by the exclusion of capital punishment objectors, not only as to
empirical data, but as to the constitutional issue itself. The court
should be familiar with the argument, however, because it was
presented in the Supreme Court brief for capital murder defend-
ant Karu Gene White. In that brief, White contended that "the
exclusion of those jurors who were not 'death-qualified' violated
appellant's rights to a representative, impartial jury drawn from
" See Fortune, Voir Dire in Kentucky: An Empirical Study of Voir Dire in
Kentucky Circuit Courts, 69 Ky. L.J. 273, 280 (1980-81).
61 The court dismissed the contrary decisions in Grigsby and Keeten: "Both deci-
sions assume that a cognizable class does not require a common background and
experience giving rise to a distinctive, self-conscious group, but requires only shared
views and attitudes on related issues of social and legal policy-a position we reject."
673 P.2d at 692.
See id. at 711 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. at 713. Chief Justice Bird stated: "Values this strongly felt are likely to be
an integral part of an individual's basic system of beliefs and overall outlook. It is not
very likely that such values will exist in random isolation, like a preference for strawberry
ice cream .. . ." Id.
72 671 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 363 (1984). See notes 1-2
supra and accompanying text.
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a cross-section of the community. ' 73 While an in-depth analysis
of available empirical data was not presented to the court,74 the
brief did cite Hovey v. Superior Court,75 which contains detailed
data analysis.
76
The Commonwealth argued in response to White's brief that
even though new studies have been completed since Witherspoon
v. Illinois,77 "no Court has found appellant's data so compelling
as to require that jurors not be excluded under a Witherspoon
test."75 The court was apparently persuaded by the Common-
wealth's argument, stating simply that "[a] number of arguments
are made by White on the application of the test in Witherspoon
v. Illinois. We have examined all those instances and are of the
opinion the trial court acted properly in each instance. ' 79 The
representativeness of the jury was never mentioned.
This disregard of the issue by the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky is perhaps the most prohibitive roadblock to a successful
challenge of the death-qualified jury in Kentucky. A second
roadblock is the position the Kentucky Supreme Court maintains
in relation to the exclusion of any group and the potential
violation of the fair cross-section requirement resulting from
71 Brief for Appellant at 250, White v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.2d 241. The same
argument was made for Todd Ice. See Brief for Appellant, at 215-18, Ice v. Common-
wealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 192 (1984).
,4 The brief stated that the failure to discuss the studies at length was due to a
"good faith attempt to comply with this Court's page limitation." Brief for Appellant
at 253 n.10, 671 S.W.2d 241. It may be inferred, however, that this is actually a result
of defense counsel's impression that lengthy discussion would be of little help in per-
suading the Supreme Court.
71 616 P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980).
76 The Hovey court noted that "[r]oughly two dozen studies, experiments and
surveys were introduced at or were the subject of expert testimony during the evidentiary
hearing below." Id. at 1314. The court discussed over 10 different surveys at length,
and analyzed the data presented. See id. at 1315-1345. Numerous tables were reproduced
in the opinion, as well as determinations of the statistical significance of the differences
found. Id.
7, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
7'8 Brief for Appellee at 92, White v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.2d 241. This reply
was identical to the one given in the Todd Ice brief: "[N]o court has found appellant's
data to be so compelling as to require that jurors not be excluded under a Witherspoon
test." Brief for appellee at 210, Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671.
7 671 S.W.2d at 245 (footnote omitted). The Kentucky Supreme Court also ignored
the issue in its Ice opinion. See 667 S.W.2d at 676. The Court's focus was that
Witherspoon did not permit a prosecutor to specifically inquire whether a juror could
impose the death penalty in the case before the jury. Id.
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that exclusion. In Ford v. Common wealth,80 for example, Ford
was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 8'
On appeal he contended that women, young adults and college
students were underrepresented on the grand and petit juries that
convicted him.82 As to young adults and college students, the
Court found no special characteristics, interests or cohesive traits
that merit their classification as distinctive groups.83 The Court
reached the same conclusion regarding young adults in McQueen
v. Commonwealth .84
As to the challenge that women were underrepresented, the
Ford Court acknowledged that women do constitute a distincitve
group, 5 satisfying the first prong of the Duren test.8 6 The Court
held, however, that statistical data regarding the second and
third requirements of the Duren test were not sufficient to es-
tablish a prima facie case of underrepresentation.8 7 The opinion
noted that Ford failed "to prove underrepresentation at all,
much less for a significant period of time; and ... demonstrated
no selection procedure which is susceptible to abuse or is not
racially neutral, all of which factors are required by Casteneda
v. Partida."8
The Court's reliance on any requirements of that case is
strained for two reasons: first, Casteneda dealt with grand, not
665 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. 1983).
I d. at 306.
'2 See id. at 306, 308. Ford also contended that he was "improperly denied funds
for the employment of an additional expert statistician." Id. at 308-09. The Court held
that the denial was not improper, and stated: "We know of no statute or principle
which would authorize expenditures of public funds to conduct a witch hunt." Id. at
309.
" See id. at 308. Though some commentators contend young adults are a distinct
group, the majority reach the same conclusion as the Court in Ford. See generally
Zeigler, supra note 14, at 1067. It should be noted that the Court's language in
concluding that young adults and college students are not distinctive groups is certainly
not discouraging, especially in comparison to the California Supreme Court. See notes
63-71 supra and accompanying text. From the language used in Ford, the Kentucky
Supreme Court does not appear to require a common background, but only cohesive
traits or interests. See 665 S.W.2d at 308.
- 669 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 269 (1984). In McQueen,
the Court also found no error in refusing McQueen's request for funds to secure the
services of an expert statistician to show that death qualified juries are more prone to
conviction. See id. at 521-22.
See 665 S.W.2d at 308.
For a discussion of the Duren test see notes 33-38 supra and accompanying text.
See 665 S.W.2d at 308.
Id. (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)).
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petit, juries; and second, Casteneda was silent on the sixth
amendment.8 9 The United States Supreme Court recognized the
distinction between the equal protection rationale underlying
Casteneda and the sixth amendment fair cross-section argument.
The Court explained the difference in Duren,90 decided two years
after Casteneda. The evidence presented to reveal an equal pro-
tection violation showed a significant discrepancy between the
size of the group allegedly excluded and the number of members
of the group actually called to serve as jurors.9 * That evidence
must also indicate discriminatory purpose, "another essential
element of the constitutional violation [equal protectionl." 92 In
sixth amendment fair cross-section cases, however, "'systematic
disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defend-
ant's interest in a jury chosen from a fair community cross
section. The only remaining question is whether there is adequate
justification for this infringement." 93
CONCLUSION
Empirical data now seems to prove that challenging for cause
jurors opposed to the death penalty creates a jury unrepresen-
tative of the community. Justice Brennan has, in fact, stated
that an evidentiary hearing on this issue is necessary. 94 Because
of the uncertainty involved with United States Supreme Court
review, however, it is imperative that the Kentucky Supreme
Court examine the evidence and weigh it against the relevant
state interests.
The remedial issue is perhaps the most difficult on which to
speculate. The most viable alternative would appear to be the
use of a bifurcated trial procedure in which death penalty atti-
tude is the basis for exclusion only at the penalty phase 5 Since
Kentucky rules already provide for a bifurcated trial process,
96
" See 430 U.S. at 483, 493.
- Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
1, Id. at 368 n.26.
9Z Id.
Id.
See Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 64 & n.7 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91 See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1,323 (1983); Berry, supra note 7, at
38.
By statute, Kentucky provides that in a case in which the death penalty may be
imposed, the jury must first determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. If found
guilty, the jury then hears further evidence on aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and makes a sentence" recommendation. Ky. Rv. STAr. § 532.025 (Baldwin 1984).
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perhaps the use of alternate jurors would be possible.9 7 Whatever
the solution, the Kentucky Supreme Court must first address the
problem.
John Coleman Ayers
"I See Paisley, The Federal Rule on Alternate Jurors, 51 A.B.A. J. 1044 (1965);
Note, Substitution of Alternate Jurors During Deliberations: Constitutional and Proce-
dural Considerations, 57 NoTaE DAmE LAw. 137 (1981-82).
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